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Italian  private  firms  can  be  classified,  in  terms  of  form  of  ownership,  either  as
independent firms or as  members of larger organizations, such as national business groups or
foreign  multinational  corporations.  Business  groups  are a  pervasive  form  of  organization  in
several countries,  including  Italy. They exist  in a  variety  of types,  ranging  from  hierarchical
groups with a pyramidal structure to associative groups pursuing their common interest thlrough  a
more informal system of co-ordinated decision making. In this paper we plan to analyze the role
of group membership  in alleviating capital market imperfections faced by firms in Italy. In ihis
perspective, business groups and indeed multinational corporations can be seen as organizational
forms that allow a mitigation of the information and contract enforcement problems that arise in
accessing external financial resources. On the one hand, business groups allow the formation of
an internal capital market that may partially replace the capital allocation function of the external
market.  A  group  can  pool  funds  from  different  affiliates  and  reallocate  them  to  the  most
profitable uses'.  On the other hand business groups may also improve access to external capital
markets. In some countries (e.g. Japan and Germany) groups are organically linked with banks
that play  an  important  role in  financing,  monitoring,  and  co-ordinating  activities  of  member
firms. The association with banks can be seen as another way to minimize information problems
and to  more closely  align the incentives of borrowers and  lenders. Multinational  corporations
play a  similar role  in creating an  internal capital  market and  in  facilitating their subsidiaries'
access to external funds. When trying to obtain external finance, subsidiaries are very likely to
Williamson  (1975) discusses  this issue in the context of conglomerates.  For a theoretical analysis  of
costs and benefits  of internal  versus external  capital  markets in allocating  financial  funds see Gertner,
Scharfstein  and Stein (1994).
2benefit from the financial strength, reputation, geographical and (often) product diversification of
the parent company.
In Italy most  private firms are owned and controlled by  families. Sometimes control  is
exercised over several separate companies through complex pyramidal organizational structures
(hierarchical business groups) that allow a  retention of control  rights, while at the same time
minimizing  financial requirements to  do so.2 In any  case, controlling coalitions tend to own a
3 large fraction of the shares of the company3. National  business groups operate in a context  of
underdeveloped  capital markets,  in which  bank loans  are the most  common  form of  external
finance 4. Contrary to the experience of other bank-based countries,  such as Japan and Germany,
the role of banks in equity financing is marginal and it is unusual for bankers to sit on the boards
of directors of industrial firms or to play an active role in influencing industrial firrms'  strategic
decisions. It is however true that, partly for historical reasons, large business groups have special
informal relations with national financial institutions. Some of the latter are considered to play an
important  role  not  only  in  financing  but  also  in  acting  as  exclusive  clubs  where  mutual
shareholdings are organized and, more generally, decisions on corporate control are taken 5.
It is common wisdom in Italy that members of large national business groups are likely to
face more favorable lending terms than indeper.  1ent firms. The existence of these informal links
to financial institutions, together with the more diversified nature of business groups is perceived
In the early eighties new groups were set up and existing groups were expanded by splitting single
companies  in several legally  independent  units because  of fiscal benefits.
3  In 1990  the three main shareholders  of quoted  and unquoted  joint stock companies  owned on average
respectively  71% and 91% of total equity  (Cannari,  Marchese  and Pagnini, 1993).
4  See Mayer (1990)  for comparative  evidence  on financing  patterns  across countries.
5  Mediobanca,  by far the most important  investment  bank in Italy, is defined by the economic  press as
the "salon  of Italian capitalism".
3as a distinctive advantage in obtaining external funds for affiliated firms. Moreover, most firms
quoted in the national stock market are members of the largest business groups, which enhances
their advantage in obtaining funds from security markets6. Subsidiaries of foreign multinational
corporations  are  also  likely  to  enjoy  favorable  relations  with  domestic  banking  institutions,
although  perhaps  not  as  good  as  affiliates  to  large  national  groups.  Moreover  they  have  a
distinctive  advantage  in  accessing  international  capital  markets,  either  directly  or  indirectly
through the parent company.
No  systematic investigation  has  been conducted  to  date on  the effect  of  the  form  of
ownership on the substitutability between internal and external finance. The purpose of this paper
is to fill this gap and to test whether financial constraints are more severe for independent firms
vis-a-vis affiliated firms, and whether there are-differences between members of national groups
and  subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations. One standard approach to  assessing the
substitutability of internal and external sources has been to investigate the excess sensitivity of
investment to cash flow for different categories of firms 7. In our paper we address this issue by
investigating the role of cash flow in both leverage and investment equations. The advantage of
this approach is twofold. First, the effect of the availability of internal finance on capital structure
decisions  contains  important  information  on  the  degree  of  substitutability  between  different
sources of funds that should be exploited. Second, the joint empirical analysis of both decisions
6  Notice that the stock market plays on the whole a very limited role in Italy. For instance the ratio of
the market value of quoted companies  to GDP in 1991  was 102.3%  in the UK, 61.4% in the US, but
only  14.8% in Italy (FIBV - Federation Internationale Bourses des Valeurs - Statistics, 1992).
However,  in the second half of the eighties some of the business  groups  members  were able to use the
stock market  as a source of funds. See also section  2.
7  See Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) for a seminal contribution  in this area. See also Hoshi,
Kashyap  and Scharfstein  (1991) for an analysis  of the implications  of group  membership  in Japan.
4acts as a stringent consistency check on the conclusions one reaches on the existence and severity
of financial constraints for different firms. Finally, the econometric analysis of the role of cash
flow in leverage equations also allow us to investigate whether agency costs associated with the
conflicts  between managers  and shareholders differ between  members of national  groups and
subsidiaries of multinational corporations.
In our empirical  work we make  use of a  novel dataset of  Italian firms  constructed  at
CERIS by merging balance sheet information on firms, published yearly by Mediobanca,  with
qualitative information on firms'  form of ownership taken directly from company  reports  that
permits us to classify firms as members of a national business group, subsidiaries of a  foreign
multinational corporation, or other national firms. Section 2 of the paper discusses the nature of
the data set and summarizes the relevant descriptive statistics.  Section 3 presents  an empirical
analysis of the  determinants of firms'  leverage decisions,  whereas  in section  4 the  effects  of
financial variables on fixed investment are tested. Concluding remarks are provided in section 5.
2.  Descriptive Statistics on Cash Flow and Financial Debt
In this section we provide both a brief description of the unbalanced sample of firms used
in this paper and some descriptive evidence on the evolution of the financial variables which are
used in the econometric analysis discussed in the following sections. Real and financial data are
available for 1229 firms over the period 1977-1990. The number of consecutive observations for
each firm ranges from a maximum of 14 to a minimum of 1. In each year, firms are allocated to
one of these categories: members of large national business groups, foreign subsidiaries, or other
5national firms8. Firms are classified as affiliates of large national groups if they are controlled,
directly or indirectly, in the relevant year by the following 18 groups: Agnelli - Fiat, De Benedetti
- Cir,  Ferruzzi  - Montedison,  Fininvest  - Mondadori,  Pesenti  - Italmobiliare,  Pirelli,  Barilla,
Benetton, Cartiere Burgo, Falck, Ferrero, Gft, Lucchini, Marzotto, Merloni, Miroglio, Parmalat,
and  Smi.  These  groups  represented  the  'core' of  the  private  national  industrial  sector  in  the
eighties and most of them have been ranked in the top positions in terms of size since the first
incomplete list of groups was published by Mediobanca in 1983. Furthermore, these groups are
the only  private  groups with  a consolidated turnover  greater than  1,000 billion  Lira  in  1990.
Firms are classified as foreign subsidiaries if the parent company is foreign. Finally, firms  are
classified as other national firms when they do not satisfy the requirements to be included in the
first two categories. This category contains mainly independent companies, but firms affiliated to
smaller and younger business groups are also included. We have grouped these two types of firms
together for two reasons. First, information on the organizational structure of the smaller business
groups is not very rich (especially in the first years of our sample period) and the decision to
allocate some firms to a given business group (especially in the case of indirect control) wouid
have  been  rather  arbitrary.  Second,  the  smaller  business  groups  are  more  similar  to  the
independent  firms  in  our  sample  than  to  the  large  business  groups  in  terms  of  size  and
diversification.
As can be seen from Table 1, out of a total of 7633 firm-year observations, 1489 pertain to
large national groups, 2462 to  subsidiaries of multinationals and 3682 to  firms not  associated
8  See the Data Appendix  for additional  information.  In the econometric  estimates  firms with less than 4
consecutive  observations  have been excluded.
6with either. The average number of employees is  1127 (1044 after excluding firms with fewer
than 4 consecutive observations). However, this  figure hides significant differences among our
three sub-samples. In fact, the average size of firms that are members of large national business
groups (2603 or 2350 employees, depending on the sample used) is much bigger than the average
size of subsidiaries of multinationals (1057 or 1024 employees) and of other domestic companies
(577 or 561 employees).
In  the  descriptive  analysis  that  follows,  we  discuss  the  evolution  of  cash  flow  and
indebtedness for the firms in each of the three categories. For both variables we compute and plot
the median (Q2),the first decile (Dl),  the first quartile (Ql),  the third quartile (Q3) and the ninth
decile (D9) 9.
We start our analysis by focusing  on the dynamics of  internal finance over time.  Pre-
dividend cash flow divided by total assets (computed as the sum of the replacement value of fixed
assets and the accounting value of gross working capital) is used as a proxy for internal finance' .
Pre-dividend cash flow is computed by subtracting the sum of total labor costs, interest paid and
taxes from value added. In Figures la,  lb  and  Ic percentiles are plotted for the sub-samples of
members of large national business groups, affiliates to foreign multinationals, and other national
firms  respectively. The  data  show  that  internal finance  moves  procyclically  for  all  firms.  It
declines in the 1981-82 recessionary period that follows the second oil shock and the tightening
9  The figures that follow are obtained using the unbalanced dataset. In  order to  check that our
descriptive evidence is not  contaminated by changes in  the sample composition we have also
calculated the percentiles for a balanced sample of firms. The results are very similar and are not
reported  here.
to Since we compute our measure of cash flow by subtracting nominal interests, it incorporates the
component  of interests  which represents  an advance on loan repayment.  Since the data set does not
contain information  on dividend  payments,  we cannot  calculate  retentions.
7of monetary policy. Then, following the economic recovery which started in  1983, we observe a
steady increase in internal finance up to 1987. Finally, cash flow declines again in the most recent
years,  partly  anticipating  the  recession  that  occurred  at  the  beginning  of  the  nineties.  The
comparison  between  our three  figures  does  not  suggest  any  striking  difference  in  either  the
dynamics or the levels of  cash flow. even if firms affiliated to large national business groups
seem on the whole less profitable than the others (this is particularly true for the lower tail of the
distribution). The fact that firms that do not belong to national or foreign groups are at least as
profitable as the other firms in the sample is a useful result since it suggests that differences that
we may discover in their leverage and investment choices are not due to independent firms' poor
economic performance.
Figures 2a to 2c highlight some interesting aspects of the dynamics of total financial debt
divided by total assets for the three sub-samples of companies".  Two remarks are in order. First,
in Italy bank loans constitute the bulk of financial debt. Although our sample does not contain
separate information for bank and non-bank debt, additional aggregate information on 779 large
firms and 191 smaller firms suggest that bank loans represent 79.2 % of the total for the former
and 85.4 % for the latter. Second, for affiliated firms the data do not allow us to distinguish the
portion of debt obtained from the parent company or from other members of the group. There is a
sense in which this is not fundamental for the object of our investigation. In fact belonging to a
group relaxes financial constraints for member firms both because it creates an internal capital
market  and  because  it  enhances  the  access  to  funds  external  to  the  group.  Moreover,  the
additional Mediobanca data referred to above suggests that intra-group financial debt represents
"  Trade debt is not included in total financial  debt.
8an average of only  13.2 % of total  debt, so that debt external to the group constitutes  the vast
majority of financial debt'2. This  means that the leverage equations we will estimate  are very
likely  to  provide  information  about  the  substitutability  between  internal  funds  and  financial
resources  external not  only to the  individual firm, but  also  to  the group  (national  or foreign
multinational).
It is apparent from Figure 2 that both members of large national business groups and other
domestic  companies  are characterized  by  a  higher  leverage compared  to  the  sub-sample  of
affiliates  to  foreign  multinationals. There  are  two  interesting differences  in  the dynamics  of
leverage that distinguishes non-affiliated firmns  from the rest . First, we observe at the beginning
of the 1981-82 recession an increase of leverage for the median firm of the sample of members of
large national groups. Such an increase occurs for foreign subsidiaries (below the 3rd quartile) as
well,  but  does not occur for non-affiliated  firms.  This suggests that,  in the  face of monetary
tightening and recession, firms that are members of larger organizations can make up the shortfall
in cash flow with access to external funds. This is consistent with the flight to quality hypothesis
(Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1992), whereby in bad times investors concentrate their funding
on those firms with lower agency costs due to asymmetric information and contract enforcement
problems.  Affiliated  firmns  with  low  debt are prime  candidates  for external funding.  Second,
following  the  recovery  (1983-88),  we  observe  a  steady  decline in  leverage  for  affiliates  to
national groups and (although less pronounced) for subsidiaries of foreign multinationals whereas
this trend is much less pronounced or absent in the sample of  independent firms.  A possible
12  See Mediobanca,  Dati Cumulativi di  1790 SocietA  Italiane (1992). Transfer of financial resources
between  associated  firms could also occur  through transfer  prices. However  there is no way, using our
data, to quantify  the importance  of this channel.
9explanation for this finding is that affiliated firms were able to issue new shares in the years of
recovery,  which were  used  partly to  repay debt. Unfortunately  our  data  set does  not  contain
information on new share issues. Another possible explanation is that the degree of centralization
of financial  management  increased in  business  groups over  the  eighties, possibly  inducing  a
reduction in the level of debt of affiliated companies.
3.  Leverage Equations and the Relation between Internal and External Finance
In the presence of asymmetric  information between insiders and  outside investors  and
contract enforcement  problems, internal and  extemal  finance are not  perfect substitutes  in the
sense that firms will have to pay a premium to obtain outside funds or, in some cases, they may
be completely  rationed'3. Abstracting from tax considerations,  firms will have a preference to
finance investment internally, then with  debt. Only as debt becomes riskier, will firms finally
14 issue equity. This is what Myers (1984) calls the "pecking order" theory of financing  . On the
basis of this argument we would expect a negative association between debt and internal finance
for given investment opportunities.  Since the severity of asymmetric information and contract
enforcement  problems  is  likely  to  vary  across  firms,  the  degree  of  substitutability  between
internal and external sources is also expected to differ across firms. In the context of a leverage
equation, this means that we would expect a negative and larger in absolute value coefficient on
cash flow ( used here as a proxy for internal finance) for firms less affected by capital market
imperfections  problems.  This  can  be  most  easily  understood  if  we  assume  that  cash  flow
13  On rationing,  see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
14  See also Myers  and Majluf  (1984).
10decreases, while the expected profitability of investment remains constant. If a firm has to pay a
premium for borrowing, it will replace cash flow with debt, but less than one for one. The greater
the premium is, the smaller the increase in debt will be.
However,  matters  are more  complicated  than that.  First,  a  change  in  cash  flow  may
change expectations on future profitability  and shift the demand for funds schedule. Second, a
change in cash flow, if it is at least partly observed by outside investors  and if it is thought to
provide  information  about  industry  wide  trends,  may  lead  to  a  revised  valuation  of
collateralizable assets. For instance a positive cash flow shock could increase their value and lead
to a decreased premium  on debt. Both these effects may weaken or even reverse the negative
association between cash flow and leverage. It has also been suggested  (Jensen and  Meckling,
1976) that debt helps in mitigating the conflict that arises between managers and shareholders due
to the fact that the former bear the cost but do not capture the entire gain from profit enhancement
activities. In this situation managers may have an incentive in consuming perquisites and invest
less  efforts  in  managing  firm's  activities.  Jensen  (1986)  suggests  that  debt  constitutes  a
commitment to pay out cash, limits managers' discretion, and reduces the agency costs associated
1  5 with the managers-shareholders conflict (the "free cash flow" hypothesis)  . Also for this reason,
one may observe a positive association between cash flow and leverage (when cash flow is high
the benefits of debt are also high), for a given level of investment opportunities.  However, this
last argument  is  unlikely  to  be  important  for  independent  Italian  firms.  Not  only  are  most
companies not  quoted but  top management  positions are very  often filled by members  of the
5  See also Stulz (1990) for a formal model  of financial  structure based on the disciplinary  role of debt,
in which debt payments  reduce free cash flow.
11family owning the company, reducing agency costs. This problem is likely to be more severe for
large national business groups and, particularly, for foreign multinationals. It is in fact in these
larger organizations where the standard agency problems between shareholders and managers are
more likely to occur. However,  the fact that controlling coalitions in domestic business groups
usually hold a large fraction of shares (which somewhat mitigates the conflict) suggests that the
problem  is probably greater for  subsidiaries of multinational corporations that  tend to  have a
more diffuse ownership structure.
In the light of the above discussion the relationship between cash flow and financial debt
is essentially an empirical matter. Summarizing, asymmetric information considerations  would
lead  to  a  negative  relationship,  given  the  state  of  expectations  and  the  severity  of  agency
problems between managers and shareholders. The negative association should be stronger  the
greater the substitutability between internal and extemal sources. In the absence of managers -
shareholders  agency  problems,  we  can  test  for  cross-firm  differences  in  substitutability  by
allowing the coefficients to differ in leverage equations between firms that are expected to suffer
less  (affiliated  firms)  or  more  (independent  firms)  from  information  problems.  Although
expectational considerations may mitigate or reverse the negative relationship between debt and
cash  flow, there is no  obvious reason  why this  importance should vary systematically  across
firms. However, as already mentioned, it is possible that differences in the cash flow coefficient
may also reflect the agency problems between managers and shareholders. Since such problems
are likely to be more important when cash flow increases than when cash flow decreases, we will
allow  the  cash  flow  coefficient  to  differ,  depending  which  of  these  two  cases  occurs.  The
coefficient  is  more likely  to  be  negative when  cash  flow decreases  because  in this  case the
12pecking order argument is more likely to dominate. Note that if we find in this case a coefficient
which is negative and larger in absolute value for firms that are group members (or subsidiaries
of multinationals), that is a clear indication that there is greater substitutability between internal
and  external  sources  of  finance  for  those  finns,  compared  to  non-affiliated  firms.  Agency
problems between managers and shareholders are surely more important for affiliates of national
or foreign multinational  groups (particularly the latter) than for independent firms. This  would
tend to make the cash flow coefficients less negative.
In this section we provide some econometric  evidence on the relation between  internal
16 finance and firm's capital structure'  . We use the following estimation strategy. As a benchmark,
we start from  a very  simple leverage equation  where the ratio of total  financial debt  to total
assets, (B/K)t is explained in terms of the lagged dependent variable, (B/K)t,I, the ratio between
cash  flow and total assets, (C/K), , and the contemporaneous and lagged changes in real sales,
DlogYt and DlogY ,_. In this  section we have defined cash flow gross of interest payments  in
order to avoid introducing a spurious negative correlation between leverage and cash flow, which
could  result  if  the  latter was  defined  net  of interest  payments.  Using  appropriate  firm  type
dummies,  all the coefficients are allowed to  differ between affiliates to  large national  groups,
foreign multinationals and independent firms. We then interact (C/K)t with a dummy variable, Dt
which equals one if the ratio between cash flow and total assets increases between time t-I  and t,
and zero otherwise.
16  The empirical literature on the determination  of capital structure is vast. See for instance  Titman and
Wessel (1988) and the extensive references in Harris and Raviv (1991) for the US. There are few
papers on Italy with the exceptions  of Bonato and Faini (1990), and Faini, Galli and Giannini (1991).
A good survey on both theoretical  and institutional  aspects in the Italian context is Bonato, Hamaui
and Ratti (1993).
13In order to eliminate time invariant firm specific characteristics that affect capital structure
choices we estimate all the equations in first differences. In order to allow for the endogeneity of
the regressors, estimation is carried out by the Generalized Method of Moments technique, using
appropriately  lagged  variables  as  instruments''.  Cash flow  and  sales  growth  are likely  to  be
correlated  with the  error  term, as well as  the dummy variables  used to  define the  regime  of
increasing  (decreasing)  cash  flow. Assuming that the  idiosyncratic  component  of the  error  is
serially uncorrelated  in the level equations, this  will generate an error with  a moving  average
structure  of order  one  in  the equations  in  differences,  so that  also  once-lagged variables  are
correlated with the error term. However, values of the regressors lagged twice or more will be
legitimate instruments. In order to check the validity of the assumptions embedded in our model
we calculate and report tests on both first and second order serial correlation on the residuals (Ml
and M2 respectively) as well as the Hansen/Sargan test of the correlation of the instruments with
the error term as a general test of mispecification. We also include three sets of year dummies
(one for each sub-sample of firmns)  in all the equations, to allow for time effects common to each
group  of  firms.  Year  dummies  can  be  thought  to  capture,  among  other  things,  changes  in
expectations about demand or changes in the interest rate and in tax parameters that are common
to all firms in each sub-sample.
In Table 2 we report the estimates of the specification of the leverage equation that does
not allow for asymmetry on the cash flow coefficients. The Hansen/Sargan test is not suggestive
of gross forms of mispecification. The M, and M2 tests suggest that the error terrn has a moving
average structure of order one, as one would expect in the differenced form of the equation, when
7  See Arellano and Bond (1988, 1991).
14the idiosyncratic component of the error term in the level equation is serially uncorrelated. Both
18 tests suggest that variables lagged twice or more are legitimate instruments'  . The estimated cash
flow coefficient is negative and significant only for the sub-sarnple of firmns  affiliated to  large
national  business  groups  (-.387  with  a  t  ratio  of  4.61),  suggesting  a  higher  degree  of
substitutability  between  external  and internal  finance  for this  type  of firms'9. The cash  flow
coefficient is instead positive and significant both for independent firms and for subsidiaries of
foreign  multinationals.  These  results  are consistent  with  a  smaller  degree  of  substitutability
between internal and external finance for these firms. However, in the case of subsidiaries of
multinational corporations, the positive sign of cash flow is likely to be due to the presence of
agency problems between managers and shareholders, as well. The coefficient on lagged leverage
is positive and less than one for all the sub-samples of firms. T  his implies that the change in the
debt to capital ratio is negatively related to the initial degree of leverage, as one would expect
since more highly indebted firms face greater risks of bankruptcy and greater agency problems 20.
The overall effect of firm's growth rate is negative for subsidiaries of foreign multinationals and
positive for the other two sub-samples of firms. A negative effect is likely to capture the fact that
the potential for managers to invest in value decreasing projects is greater when there are growth
opportunities. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that this particular agency problem is more
severe for foreign multinationals than for nationally owned firms. This is certainly true in the case
of non-affiliated  firms where management and ownership basically coincide, but it is also true
18  These comments  also apply  to the equations  in Tables 3 through  7.
9  The cash flow coefficient for affiliated firms is significantly  different at the conventional  statistical
level from those for both multinationals  and independent  finns.
20  This can be seen by subtracting  (B/K)t- from both sides  of the leverage  equations.
15(relative to  foreign subsidiaries) for members of large national groups. As a result, the role of
sales  growth  in  capturing  greater  actual  investment  and  hence  a  greater  need  for  finance
dominates in these cases.
In Table 3, the cash  flow coefficient  is allowed to differ depending whether cash  flow
increases (D=  I) or decreases (D, = 0). The coefficients on cash flow are negative and significant
in both  regimes for the sample of affiliates to large national groups, although the coefficient is
larger in absolute value when cash flow decreases. This is what we would expect, since it is when
cash flow is aburndant  that manager-shareholder agency problems are likely to be more important.
Both cash flow coefficients are positive for independent firms and of fairly similar size. For the
subsidiaries of foreign multinationals the coefficient on cash flow is positive and significant in
the regime of increasing cash flow but very small and insignificant in the regime of decreasing
cash  flow. The large positive coefficient  for foreign subsidiaries, when cash  flow increases, is
consistent with the greater importance in that case of the agency problems outlined in the "free
cash flow" hypothesis.
4.  The Effects of Financial Factors on Investment
In the previous  section we found evidence that is consistent with the idea that external
finance is a very imperfect substitute for internal finance for independent firms while the degree
of  substitutability  is  higher  for  affiliated  firms.  The  next  step  is  to  test  whether  imperfect
substitutability has an impact on firns'  real policies. We estimate a simple accelerator model of
16company investment21  with the ratio of investment to fixed capital stock, (I/KF)t  as the dependent
variable 22. In addition to the lagged investment rate and the contemporary and lagged changes in
real sales, we also include the ratio of cash flow to fixed capital stock, (C/KF)t and the ratio of
F) total debt to fixed capital stock, (B/K )t as regressors. The cash flow variable in this section has
been defined net of interest  payments, as in most  recent  empirical papers  on investment.  23As
suggested  by  Fazzari,  Hubbard and  Petersen (1988)  differences  in the  size of  the  cash  flow
coefficients provide information on the importance of liquidity constraints.  This approach  has
been used to assess the effects of group membership in Japan by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein
(1991).They found that firms that are members of an industrial/financial group are less sensitive
to cash flow fluctuations.
Obviously,  a  significant positive  cash  flow  effect  on  investment does  not  necessarily
reflect the presence of financing constraints, but may simply depend upon the fact that cash flow
conveys information on expected profitability. However, as already mentioned, we minimize the
risk of misinterpreting our empirical results by focusing on differences in the coefficients on cash
flow among sub-samples of firms. In this case, if differences are found it is rather implausible to
attribute them to differences in expectations formation 24.
21  The importance  of capital market imperfections  for investment  decisions  can be investigated  using a
different approach  based on the Euler equation  for the capital stock. See Whited  (1992) for panel data
evidence for the US, Bond and Meghir (1994) for the UK, and Galeotti, Schiantarelli  and Jaramillo
(1994), and Rondi, Sembenelli  and Zanetti  (1994) for Italy.
22  Note that the median value of (I/K  F)t  is .104 for the sample  of affiliates  to large national  groups, .100
for the sample  of foreign  subsidiaries,  and .102  for the other national  firms.
23  The results are very similar if cash flow is defined  gross of interest  payments.
24  Gilchrist  and Himmelberg  (1994) present  evidence  that the mechanism  of expectation  formation does
not differ significantly  among  US firms.
17As  in the previous  section, all estimates are carried  out in first differences to eliminate
firm specific characteristics, using GMM estimation techniques to allow for the endogeneity of
the regressors. In all the reported equations three sets of year dummies are included, to allow time
specific effects to differ between the three sub-samples of firms.
We start from a specification which includes the lagged dependent variable, (I/K  F)t  , the
contemporaneous and lagged ratios of cash flow to fixed capital, and the contemporaneous and
lagged rates of  change  in  output  (Table 4).  The coefficients  on contemporary  cash  flow  are
positive  and  significant  for  both  affiliated  and  independent  national  firms.  However,  the
coefficient is about twenty times larger for the sub-sample of independent firms (.41 versus .02).
In  contrast,  the  coefficient  on  contemporary  cash  flow  for  the  sub-sample  of  foreign
multinationals is instead negative and significant, although very small (-.06). The coefficient on
lagged cash flow is positive for multinational firms (.06) so that the sum of the coefficients on
contemporaneous and  lagged cash flow is virtually zero. It is negative for the sub-samples  of
affiliated and independent national firms (-.01 and -.20 respectively). The sum of the coefficients
for independent firms is positive and still about twenty times larger than that of affiliates to large
national groups. This indicates that the availability of internal funds for firms that are either group
members or  subsidiaries of  foreign multinationals is  less important  for investment  decisions,
since their group association  makes it easier to  tap the external capital market, as well as the
capital market internal to the group. As expected, the coefficients on the rates of growth in sales
are positive  and  significant  in  most  cases.  Interestingly  the  sales  coefficients  are  larger  for
multinational firms, suggesting that they respond more strongly to demand stimuli, whereas the
point estimates for affiliated and independent national firms are remarkably similar.
18To check the robustness of these results we rerun the equation in Table 4, after omitting
the lagged cash  flow variable (Table  5). The coefficients on cash  flow  for non-affiliated  and
affiliated national firms are both positive and significant but the formner  is ten times bigger than
25 the latter. The coefficient for multinationals does not differ significantly  from zero  . We have
performed  other  experiments  by  allowing  more  dynamics  in  our  basic  equation  with  the
introduction of twice lagged regressors for all the variables in the model. We do not report these
results  for  reasons  of  space.  The  basic  conclusions  do  not  change  and,  in  any  case,  the
coefficients on the additional lags do not differ significantly from zero. We have also replaced the
rates of change in output either with the levels of output or with the ratios of the change in output
to fixed capital, and we have also added the rates of change in industry output to the equation.
Our basic findings were not altered in any of  these altemative specifications.
In Table 6, we expand our basic equation with the introduction of the ratio between total
financial debt and fixed capital as a regressor. The inclusion of this variable is meant to capture
the concept that the premium on extemal finance is an increasing function of leverage. We would
therefore expect a negative relationship between the degree of leverage and investment. What is
more important in our framework however,  is that the coefficient should be more negative for
those  types  of  firms  characterized  by  more  severe  asymmetric  information  or  contract
enforcement problems. In fact the coefficient of leverage is negative, large in absolute value and
significant for non-affiliated  firms. For instance, when (B/KF)t increases from the first quartile
(.265) to the third quartile (.875), the investment to fixed capital ratio decreases by .018, which
25  The cash flow coefficient for non-affiliated firms is significantly  different, at conventional levels,
from the one for members  of national  business  groups  (t = 8.15) and for foreign subsidiaries  (t = 8.60).
19corresponds  to  a  14.6% decrease  relative  to  the  average  value  over  the  period  (.123).  The
coefficient on leverage is not significantly different from zero for subsidiaries of multinational
corporations. Although we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is zero for firms affiliated
to large national groups, it is so minuscule (-.0003) that it is not economically significant.
Finally, as we have done for the leverage equations, we allow the cash flow coefficient to
vary depending whether cash flow increases (Dt =  1) or decreases (Dt  =  0). The dummy, Dt can be
interpreted  as  a  discrete  and  firm  specific  indicator  of business  cycle  conditions,  signalling
respectively  their  improvement  or  worsening26.  If  asymmetric  information  or  contract
enforcement problems  are more likely to occur in bad times, we would expect  a positive and
greater in absolute value coefficient on cash flow when Dt = 0. As can be seen from Table 7, this
indeed occurs for independent firms that are neither members of national large groups nor foreign
affiliates.  In  fact, not  only  the coefficients  for independent companies  are  both  significantly
greater in absolute value than the coefficients for the other types of firms but also the coefficient
for  the  cases  when  cash  flow decreases  is  2.7  times  greater  (and  significantly  so)  that  the
coefficient for the cases when cash flow increases (.41 versus .15). The effect of cash flow is very
small in both regimes (although statistically different from zero) for subsidiaries of multinational
corporations and members of domestic groups 27.
26  The hypothesis that financial constraints are more likely to affect fixed investment decisions in a
recession is tested for US firms in Gertler and Hubbard (1988) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1994)
using aggwg=  indicators  of business  cycle conditions.
27  The hypothesis  that the cash flow coefficients  are different in the two regimes cannot be rejected at
conventional  levels for these two types of firms, but this is of little economic  significance,  given the
small size of the coefficients.
205.  Conclusions
In  this  paper  we  provide  an  integrated  approach  to  the  analysis  of  capital  market
imperfections  at the firm  level by analyzing the role of cash  flow both  in  investment  and  in
leverage equations.  We apply our methodology  to  a large unbalanced panel of Italian  private
companies,  categorized  by  form  of  ownership.  We  find  strong  empirical  evidence  from  the
leverage equations  to  support the hypothesis  that  being part  of a  national business  alleviates
capital market imperfections. Domestic firms that are not part of large national business groups
have more difficulty in substituting internal with external finance. The results for subsidiaries of
multinational corporations are more ambigous because in their case they reflect the importance of
agency problems in the relationship between managers and shareholders as well. The large and
positive value of the cash flow coefficient, when cash flow is increasing, and the negative sales
growth  coefficient  suggest that  such problems are more important  for subsidiaries of  foreign
multinational corporations  than for  affiliates of  large national  business groups. This  is  to  be
expected,  given the  fact  that  controlling  coalitions  in  domestic  groups  usually  hold  a  large
fraction  of  shares,  while  multinational  corporations  tend  to  have  a  more  diffuse  ownership
structure.  This  particular  agency  problem  does  not  arise  for  non-affiliated  firms  since
management and ownership basically coincide.
The different degree of substitutability between cash flow and debt has implications on
firms' real choices. In fact we find that  investment decisions of non-affiliated firms  are much
more sensitive to the availability of cash flow, confirming the crucial role that internal finance
plays for them. Moreover, there is evidence of an interesting asymmetry, in the sense that the
effect of cash flow is greater when the latter decreases than when it increases. Finally, members
21of  domestic  groups  and  subsidiaries  of  multinational  corporations  show  little  or  no  excess
sensitivity to cash flow. The results obtained from the investment equations are consistent  with
those from the leverage equations for members of large national groups and for non-affiliated
firms. Subsidiaries of multinational corporations represent an intermediate and less clear cut case,
since the lack of sizeable excess cash flow sensitivity in the investment equations is not matched
by  strong  evidence  of  substitutability  between  internal and  external  finance  in  the  leverage
equations.
The overall pattern of results emphasizes the problems of the financial system in making
external finance accessible to non-affiliated firms throughout the eighties. Moreover, it is also
possible that our results actually underestimate the problem since firms that make our sample of
non-affiliated companies represent the upper tail of the size distribution of the total population of
non-affiliated firms and are less likely to face unfavorable lending terms than do even smaller
firms.  Finally,  the evidence we have presented  lends  support to  the idea that  business  cycle
shocks  may  have  important  distributional  consequences  across  various  types  of  firms,
characterized in our case by different forms of ownership.
22Data Appendix
The  primary  source  used  to  build  the  database  is  "Le  Societa  Italiane"  directory,
published  yearly  by  Mediobanca.  It  contains  condensed  balance  sheets  and  profits  and  loss
accounts together with other information (number of employees, main industrial sector, etc.) for
two consecutive years for a variable number of companies. In the first column of Table A.  1 the
number of  companies  available  in  each year is  listed. The  lower  size limit  for a  firrn  to  be
included in the directory is 10 billion lire of sales in the  1977-1984 period, 20 billion lire in the
1985-86 period, and 25 billion  lire in the  1987-90 period. The number of observations for the
whole period is 18,081. As in each directory data are available  only for two years, time series
have been obtained by merging data coming from several editions of the Mediobanca directory.
Firms'  names have been used  as the main variable in merging.  Firms whose main  activity  is
outside the manufacturing sector, State owned firms, and manufacturing firms with less than 6
consecutive observations have been excluded from the sample. After these selections the number
of observations was reduced to 8,298. The number of observations per year is reported  in the
third column of Table A.1.
Each firm has been allocated to its primary activity as defined in the three-digits NACE-
CLIO  classification.  This  has  been  done  by  using  the  MEDIOBANCA  classification,  other
available information and company reports. For each firm the stock of capital at replacement cost
has been computed following the perpetual inventory technique. From Mediobanca directories it
is also  possible  to know  whether firms have been involved  in mergers,  acquisitions  or other
extraordinary operations in a  given year. Since in this case balance sheet and  profits and  loss
account data are unlikely to be comparable with data from either the previous or the following
year, observations in years when an extraordinary operation occurred are also excluded from the
sample. The total number of observations excluded for this reason is 607. Finally, after excluding
observations with negative capital stock, we are left with an unbalanced panel of 7,633  firm-
observations and  1,229 firms (see  last column of Table A.1). Tables A.2, A. 3 and A.4 give
further  information  on  the  characteristics  of  the  sarnple. In  Table  A.2  firms  are  ranked  in
descending order according to the number of consecutive observations. In Table A.3 observations
are classified  by industry,  using  the two-digit Nace Clio classification.  Finally,  in  Table  A.4
observations  are classified  by firm's  form  of ownership as affiliates of  large national  groups,
subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations, or other national firms.
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25Table 1 - Descriptive statistics on size (number of employees)
Full sample
Mean  Number  offirm-year
observations
Full sample  1127.0  7633
Members  of large national  business  group  2602.9  1489
Foreign  subsidiaries  1057.0  2462
Other  national  firms  577.0  3682
Only  firms with more than 3 consecutive  observations
Mean  Number  offirm-year
observations
Full sample  1043.6  6912
Members  of large national  business  groups  2349.5  1278
Foreign  subsidiaries  1023.9  2268
Other  national  firms  561.0  3366Table 2  - Leverage equation: basic model;
dependent variable: (B/K)t; sample period: 1980-1990;
GMM estimates in first differences
Members  of large
national  Foreign  subsidiaries  Other nationalfirms
business  groups
(B/K)t-l  .4713  (0352)  .4411  (0091)  .4270  (0427)
(C/K)t  -.3872  (0840)  .2162  (0415)  .2178  (0784)
A log Yt  .0387  (0202)  -.1870  (0324)  .0346  (0137)
A log Yt  l  .0166  (0102)  -.0013  (0095)  -.0065  (0037)
Ml  -4.219  [763]
M2  -0.927  [692]
Sargan  195.90  [177]
Footnotes:
(1)  Instrument  list: All included  variables lagged  twice and three times.
(2)  Sub-sample  specific time dummies  included.Table 3  - Leverage equation: model with asymmetric effect of cash flow;
dependent variable: (B/K)t; sample period: 1980-1990;
GMM estimates in first differences
Members of large
national  Foreign subsidiaries  Other nationalfirms
business groups
(B/K)t-l  .4242  (0304)  .4218  (.0088)  .4341  (0348)
Dt(C/K)t  -.1865  (0833)  .3036  (0396)  .1958  (0671)
(I  -Dt)  (C/K)t  -.4142  (0914)  .0131  (.634)  .1464  (0871)
A log Yt  -.0084  (0255)  -.1621  (0280)  .0462  (0142)
A log Yt  l  .0218  (0086)  .0007  (0091)  -.0042  (0030)
-5.101  [763]
M2  -1.012  [692]
Sargan  262.12  [237]
Footnotes:
(1) Dt = I if (C/K)  t> (C/K)t,I;  Dt = 0 oth-erwise.
(2)  Instrumert list: All included  variables lagged  twice and three  times.
(3)  Sub-sample  specific  time dummies  included.Table  4  - Investment  equation:  basic  model;
dependent  variable:  (lK  F)t;  sample  period:  1980-1990;
GMM estimates in first differences
Members of large
national  Foreign subsidiaries  Other nationalfirms
business groups
(I/K  F)  .0058  (0003)  .2685  (0146)  .0639  (0155)
(C/K  F)t  .0199  (0003)  -.0649  (0077)  .4074  (0349)
(C/KF)it_  -.0130  (0003)  .0592  (0013)  -.2042  (0222)
A log Yt  .0252  (0230)  .1509  (0349)  .0300  (0099)
A log Yt-  .0016  (0086)  .0176  (0092)  .0019  (0037)
Ml  =  |  -6.040  [763]
l  M2  |  4-0.885 [692]
Sargan  185.60  [174]
Footnotes:
(1)  Instrument  list: All included  variables  lagged  twice and three times.
(2)  Sub-sample  specific time dummies  included.Table 5 - Investment equation: basic model
without lagged cash flow; dependent variable: (I/K )t;
sample period: 1980-1990; GMM estimates in first differences
Members  of large
national  Foreign  subsidiaries  Other nationalfirms
business  groups
(I/K)t  .0054  (0004)  .2505  (0157)  .0428  (0148)
(C/KF)t  .0277  (0003)  -.0014  (0055)  .2619  (0302)
(C/K  )t_l  _  _  _
AlogYt  .0522  (0228)  .1049 (0239)  .0180  (0144)
A log Yt  l  .0052  (0078)  .0185  (0083)  -.0021  (0042)
Ml  -4.239  [763]
M2 -0.779  [692]
Sargan  194.21  [177]
Footnotes:
(I)  Instrument  list: All included  variables lagged  twice and three times.
(2)  Sub-sample  specific  time dummies  included.Table 6 - Investment  equation: model with debt;
dependent variable: (I/K  F);  sample period: 1980-1990;
GMM estimates in first differences
Members of large
national  Foreign subsidiaries  Other national firms
business groups
(I/KF  )tl  .0055  (0003)  .2296  (0118)  .0276  (0135)
(C/KF  )  .0206  (0002)  .0089  (0046)  .3081  (0244)
(C/K  )t,
AlogYt  .0043  (01309)  .0852  (0165)  .0079  (0123)
AlogYt-1 .0014  (0069)  .0145  (0076)  -.0046  (0046)
(B/KF)t  -.0003  (0000)  .0003  (0004)  -.0291  (0054)
Ml  -4.404  [763]
M2  -0.776  [692]
Sargan  251.14  [237]
Footnotes:
(I)  Instrument list: All included variables lagged twice and three times.
(2)  Sub-sample specific time dummies included.Table 7  - Investment equation: model with asymmetric effect of cash flow;
dependent variable: (I/K  F),; sample period: 1980-1990;
GMM estimates in first differences
Members  of large
national  Foreign  subsidiaries  Other national  firms
business  groups
(I/KF)t_X  .0089  (0003)  .2300  (0104)  -.0056  (0077)
Dt(C/K )t  .0702  (0003)  .0086  (0034)  .1491  (0259)
(1  -Di)(C/KF),  .0250  (0002)  .0185  (0032)  .4088  (0174)
A logYt  -.0061  (0116)  .1076  (0141)  .0373  (0051)
A log Y, l  .0008  (0040)  .0124  (0060)  -.0015  (0031)
(B/KF)t  -.0006  (0001)  .0007  (0004)  -.0238  (0041)
Ml  -5.269  [763]
M2  1  -1.168  [692]
Sargan  337.79  [297]
Footnotes:
(1)  D,  =  I if  (C/KF)  t>  (C/KF)t_l;  D, =  0 otherwise.
(2)  Instrument list: All included variables lagged twice and three times.
(3)  Sub-sample specific time dummies included.Table  A.1 - Number  of observations  by year
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  (e)
1977  858  445  368  0  24  344
1978  862  447  370  1  19  350
1979  948  512  426  12  8  406
1980  1091  599  507  62  5  440
1981  1100  652  558  85  1  472
1982  1127  714  611  41  1  569
1983  1182  757  655  36  1  619
1984  1241  791  687  65  0  622
1985  1342  867  765  51  0  714
1986  1486  836  744  43  0  701
1987  1535  784  702  56  0  646
1988  1655  755  675  49  0  626
1989  1779  716  640  61  0  579
1990  1875  655  590  45  0  545
18081  9530  8298  607  59  7633
(a)  Number  of observations  in original  files
(b)  Number  of observations  after excluding  non-manufacturing  firms  and manufacturing  firms
with less than 6 consecutive  observations
(c)  Number of observations  after excluding  state-owned  firms  from (b)
(d)  Extraordinary  operation  cases
(e)  Negative capital stock cases















1  136Table A.3 - Number  of observations  by industry  (Nace-Clio 2 digits)
Nace  Number  of
Code  firm-year
observations
22  Production and preliminary processing of metals  410
24  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products  517
25  Chemical Industry  1129
26  Man-made fibres industry  78
31  Manufacture of metal articles  406
32  Mechanical Engineering  842
33  Manufacture of office machinery and data processing machinery  46
34  Electrical engineering  873
35  Manufacture of motor vehicles and of motor vehicle parts  256
36  Manufacture of other means  of transport  152
37  Instrument Engineering  123
41/42  Food, drink and tobacco industry  1042
43  Textile industry  533
44  Leather and leather goods industry  17
45  Footwear and clothing industry  280
46  Timber and wooden furniture industries  67
47  Manufactuer of paper and paper products; printing and publishing  519
48  Processing of rubber and plastics  264
49  Other manufacturing industries  79
7633Table  A.4  - Number  of observations  by type  of control
National  Foreign  National  Total
Large  Subsidiaries  Independent
Groups  Firms
1977  80  107  157  344
1978  80  108  162  350
1979  96  122  188  406
1980  92  139  209  440
1981  97  146  229  472
1982  122  178  269  569
1983  140  190  289  619
1984  134  204  2184  622
1985  132  232  350  714
1986  128  225  348  701
1987  110  217  319  646
1988  104  213  309  626
1989  89  195  295  579
1990  85  186  274  545
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